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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current system through which foreign law enforcement agencies 
request electronic data during the course of criminal investigations is broken. 
Foreign governments have grown frustrated as their efforts to investigate crimes 
and apprehend criminals have been thwarted by inefficiencies and delays in the 
data-request process. These inefficiencies have prompted foreign governments 
to engage in a number of behaviors that threaten human rights and disrupt the 
free flow of information across borders. Accordingly, the United States must 
assume a position of leadership by amending its privacy laws to fix the myriad 
problems which currently exist in the contemporary Internet privacy regime. 
This Essay examines the current reality of Internet usage worldwide, assesses 
the current international data-sharing regime, surveys potential avenues for the 
reform of that regime, and ultimately recommends that the United States take a 
measured and intentional approach towards reform. 
More than three billion citizens of the world are connected to the Internet, 
via an estimated thirteen billion different devices.1 The past decade has seen a 
marked shift towards utilizing cloud storage of Internet data,2 which results in 
the remote storage of data on huge servers owned by Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and their affiliates.3 The storage location that a particular piece of data is 
sent to depends on a number of factors, including proximity to the user, 
availability of server space, and cost.4 Estimates suggest that within this decade, 
over half of the consumer Internet population will use cloud storage, and that 
nearly all data processing will happen in cloud data centers.5 While the United 
States accounts for only about 9% of the world’s Internet users, a substantial 
majority of the most popular websites and services are run by American firms, 
and thus governed by American communications laws.6 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Privacy Act), which was 
written in 1986, extends government restrictions on transmissions of electronic 
data and includes sections pertaining to wiretapping (the Wiretap Act), stored 
communications (the Stored Communications Act), and tracing telephone 
communications (the Pen/Trap Statute).7 In short, the Privacy Act contains 
                                                                                                                     
 1 THE CHERTOFF GRP., LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO EVIDENCE IN THE CLOUD ERA 
2, https://chertoffgroup.com/files/docs/LawEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBN8-SJJ7].  
 2 Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 740–41 
(2016). 
 3 See id. at 732, 744.  
 4 THE CHERTOFF GRP., supra note 1, at 3. 
 5 See Woods, supra note 2, at 741 (noting an estimate from the Cisco Global Cloud 
Index that “by 2019, 55% of the consumer Internet population will use personal cloud storage 
and 86% of data processing will happen remotely”). 
 6 See id. at 741, 743 n.71.  
 7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510–22, JUST. INFO. SHARING, 
https://www.it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 [https://perma.cc/G6CJ-RHW5] 
(last updated July 30, 2013). 
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provisions which regulate the storage and transfer of data and prevent American 
data holders, via a blocking provision, from sharing information with foreign 
law enforcement agencies.8 Therefore, when law enforcement agencies in 
foreign countries want access to stored communications from (mostly) 
American ISPs, they must seek that data through a decades-old request process, 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs).9 Upon being denied access to 
American-held data, a foreign law enforcement agency will file a formal Mutual 
Legal Assistance (MLA) request for the data through the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA).10 OIA prepares the request and 
forwards it along to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO).11 The USAO then 
presents the MLAT request to a federal magistrate judge, who reviews the 
request under the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard required for a 
warrant.12 If the warrant request is granted, the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation presents the warrant to the ISP who then passes the relevant data 
back to the Department of Justice for a final review before the Department of 
Justice turns it over to the requesting country.13 This process takes about ten 
months on average.14 Foreign law enforcement agency requests have 
skyrocketed since 2000, exacerbating the delay in MLAT request responses.15 
Indeed, the U.K. government alone made over 22,000 separate MLA requests 
to just six of the largest U.S. technology companies.16 Foreign law enforcement 
agencies have repeatedly insisted that large numbers of investigations and cases 
are abandoned because there is no realistic possibility of obtaining the necessary 
data.17 There are also claims that shortcomings in the MLA request process have 
created safe havens for cyber criminality in places like Eastern Europe, where 
cybercrime enforcement is not prioritized and Western countries lack 
jurisdiction to intervene.18 
                                                                                                                     
 8 Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving 
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 491 (2016). 
 9 See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of 
Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 687, 697–700 (2017) (explaining how MLATs work and the process of making 
an MLA request). 
 10 Id. at 697–98.  
 11 Id. at 698.  
 12 Id. at 698–99. 
 13 Id. at 699–700. 
 14 Id. at 700. 
 15 Woods, supra note 2, at 750. 
 16 Id. at 743–44. 
 17 AD-HOC SUBGROUP ON TRANSBORDER ACCESS & JURISDICTION, CYBERCRIME 
CONVENTION COMM. (T-CY), Transborder Access to Data and Jurisdiction: Options for 
Further Action by the T-CY 12 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMM. 
(T-CY)], https://rm.coe.int/16802e726e [https://perma.cc/4C8Z-ADHU]. 
 18 THE CHERTOFF GRP., supra note 1, at 5. 
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II. MLAT PROBLEMS 
The cumbersome MLAT process has served as a catalyst, or at least as a 
justification, for a number of troubling behaviors regarding Internet regulation 
around the world.19 Accordingly, ISPs are growing wary of complying with the 
Privacy Act’s blocking provision and the MLAT process in general.20 For 
example, some countries are seeking work-arounds, such as requiring 
“backdoor” access to encrypted programs and devices and asserting their legal 
right to unilateral access to the data, whereby relying on the MLAT process is 
unnecessary.21 Finally, many countries have enacted, introduced, or considered 
laws that would limit the storage, movement, and/or processing of data to 
specific geographies or jurisdictions.22 These different responses are 
problematic in many ways which are detailed below. 
A. Threatening ISPs 
Foreign governments seeking access to American-held data essentially have 
two avenues at their disposal: the ISPs themselves or the MLAT process. ISPs 
and technology companies want to get along with foreign governments for a 
number of reasons, and it can be assumed that they comply with these sharing 
requests whenever possible.23 Given that the MLAT process is so inefficient, 
foreign governments are increasingly pressuring ISPs to share information in 
ways that are dubious in their legality.24 Google executives have even been 
arrested or detained in numerous countries under the auspices of violating local 
                                                                                                                     
 19 See, e.g., Kyle Wagner, A Brief History of Google Employees Being Arrested in 
Foreign Countries, GIZMODO (Sept. 27, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5947043/a-brief-history-of-
google-employees-being-arrested-in-foreign-countries [https://perma.cc/L3DY-LVYR] (“Google 
executives get held in foreign countries that have a beef with Google.”). 
 20 See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Want To Come to America – 
with Wiretap Orders and Search Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-british-want-to-come-to-america--
with-wiretap-orders-and-search-warrants/2016/02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9 
_story.html?utm_term=.02d598a63d01 [https://perma.cc/HVF2-G2BX]; see also CYBERCRIME 
CONVENTION COMM. (T-CY), supra note 17, at 12 (“There is a trend among providers not to 
cooperate with criminal justice officials even when permitted by law to do so.”). 
 21 Daskal, supra note 8, at 476–78. 
 22 Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and 
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Business Leaders 3–4 (May 1, 2014) 
(unpublished paper presented at Hague Institute for Global Justice Conference on the Future 
of Cyber Governance), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430275 [https://perma.cc/2C36-X8XK].  
 23 See, e.g., Andrew K. Woods, Why Does Microsoft Want a Global Convention on 
Government Access to Data?, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
7246/microsoft-global-convention-government-access-data/ [https://perma.cc/4VK5-5L84] 
(“Microsoft operates largely at the pleasure of local governments around the world, and 
reforming MLAT promises to improve these relationships.”).  
 24 See id. (describing how companies like Microsoft face enormous pressure from 
foreign governments to forego the MLAT process and hand over information directly). 
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privacy laws, a practice which is considered by some to be a “power play” 
against the company for its strict compliance with the Privacy Act and MLAT 
process.25 Companies also claim that they are feeling pressure to capitulate to 
the requests from foreign governments or face the prospect of losing large 
government contracts.26 While it appears that many American firms have 
refused to turn over data in ways that violate domestic law, industry insiders 
insist that they may soon no longer be able to do so.27 
B. Backdoor Encryption Regimes and Claims for Unilateral Access to 
Data 
Many governments have begun to insist that new encryption technologies 
be designed with an avenue for “backdoor” government access so that law 
enforcement agencies can access data that would otherwise only be available 
through the MLAT process.28 This would allow law enforcement access to a 
large amount of data, such as time and duration of photo calls, photos, and 
emails to the cloud.29 
Additionally, some countries, like Brazil and the United Kingdom, have 
begun to pass laws which assert their authority to access or seize data from ISPs 
unilaterally, so long as those ISPs do any business or have any customers in the 
country.30 Such legislation potentially forces ISPs to face a conflict of laws 
between two or more countries about whether and how to provide the requested 
data.31 
C. Data Localization 
Perhaps the most controversial response has been data localization laws. 
Data localization laws “limit the storage, movement, and/or processing of data 
to specific geographies and jurisdictions, or . . . limit the companies that can 
manage data based upon the company’s nation of incorporation or principal” 
place of business.32 More than twelve countries, including Germany, Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, France, Malaysia, Russia, and China, have 
considered or adopted data localization laws.33 Proposed data localization laws 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See Wagner, supra note 19. 
 26 Hill, supra note 22, at 4.  
 27 Nakashima & Peterson, supra note 20. 
 28 See Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System 
for Mutual Legal Assistance, in SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE SECTOR 
DATA 395, 399 (Fred H. Cate & James A. Dempsey eds., 2017). 
 29 Id. at 401. 
 30 Daskal, supra note 8, at 477. 
 31 Id. at 477–78. 
 32 Hill, supra note 22, at 3. 
 33 See generally id. (providing a sampling of specific countries’ proposed or enacted 
data localization laws). 
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vary greatly, and can consist of anything from limitations on data storage and 
transfer, to mandatory local ownership of data storage equipment, to broader 
localization rules which apply to all citizen data.34 On the whole, such laws are 
impractical, problematic, and even counterproductive. 
1. Data Localization Laws Are Impractical 
Modern computing and data storage is possible because of its flexibility and 
efficiency in transferring data.35 Critical storage infrastructure is not designed 
to operate in the ways that data localization laws mandate.36 Oftentimes, 
localization laws necessitate that firms establish data storage centers within the 
legislating country, but there are still relatively few storage facilities 
worldwide.37 Companies are very particular about the locations of their data 
storage servers, the operation and security of which are absolutely crucial for 
their business models.38 For example, Google reportedly decided to locate a 
storage facility in Ireland because of the country’s “highly educated, young, 
English-speaking workforce,” relatively low corporate tax rate, and colder 
climate which lowers energy costs associated with keeping servers from 
overheating.39 Additionally, there are strong arguments to be made that data 
localization laws make operations prohibitively expensive for foreign firms 
operating in different countries.40 In developing countries where Internet access 
and data services are significant drivers of economic growth, disruptions in the 
free flow of data could preclude trillions of dollars in future GDP growth.41 
                                                                                                                     
 34 Id. at 3–4. 
 35 See Dillon Reisman, Where Is Your Data, Really?: The Technical Case Against Data 
Localization, LAWFARE (May 22, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-
really-technical-case-against-data-localization [https://perma.cc/JC62-7C6H]. 
 36 See Hill, supra note 22, at 28–29 (describing the current use of the “best effort 
delivery model, where data is delivered to its destination in the most efficient manner 
possible, without predetermined routes”). 
 37 See, e.g., Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html [https://perma.cc/6VDT-
FZF3] (showing Google’s limited data storage centers outside the United States). For an 
examination of a modern U.S. data center, see Rich Miller, Microsoft’s $1 Billion Data 
Center, DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archive 
es/2013/01/31/microsofts-1-billion-roofless-data-center/ [https://perma.cc/M52X-S7BV]. 
 38 See Reisman, supra note 35 (describing how, in order to maintain a high degree of 
data integrity and reliability, companies require data to be backed up in multiple different 
data centers and regions). 
 39 Henry McDonald, Ireland Is Cool for Google as Its Data Servers Like the Weather, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/23/ireland-
cool-google-data-servers-weather [https://perma.cc/5JN7-HYYZ]. 
 40 Hill, supra note 22, at 6, 26. 
 41 Id. at 27. 
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2. Data Localization Laws Are Problematic for Privacy and Civil Rights 
Civil society groups and human rights activists are often quick to point to 
the current Internet regulatory regime as problematic for privacy and civil 
rights.42 These critiques are certainly not without merit in many respects, but 
data localization ironically poses a greater danger to civil rights and liberty than 
the status quo. Although there are legitimate reasons for foreign governments to 
pursue data localization policies, including economic and law enforcement 
benefits,43 nations will be in a better position to collect information on their 
citizens, control the content of information that reaches their citizens, and censor 
the media or political opposition.44 Indeed, collection alone can be used to stifle 
expressive, associational, and related rights.45 When data is localized entirely 
within one country, the local governing authorities can, if they so desire, go so 
far as to shut down Internet services if they believe those services are aiding 
political opposition groups.46 The existing worldwide Internet regime is by no 
means perfect, particularly in the ways in which it intersects with privacy and 
civil rights, but data localization policies are not the silver bullet for solving 
those problems. 
3. Data Localization Laws Are Counterproductive 
Data localization is often supported in part on the assumption that it will 
result in enhanced data security, but little evidence exists to support that 
assumption.47 Data security is ultimately a function of security safeguards at the 
storage facility, rather than a function of the location of the data.48 There are 
even indications that several countries considering data localization policies, 
like Brazil and Indonesia, “are actually among the least well-equipped nations 
to protect their data.”49 While it is true that data located in the United States is 
potentially subject to collection by the National Security Agency (NSA),50 
locating and retrieving data extraterritorially usually is subject to even weaker 
controls than those of the NSA.51 Even if foreign intelligence agencies like the 
NSA were impeded by data localization, domestic intelligence agencies, 
                                                                                                                     
 42 See Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy [https://perma. 
cc/JUS8-XT5B] (“National and international laws have yet to catch up with the evolving need 
for privacy that comes with new digital technologies.”). 
 43 Hill, supra note 22, at 19.  
 44 Id. at 28. 
 45 Daskal, supra note 8, at 481. 
 46 Hill, supra note 22, at 23. 
 47 Reisman, supra note 35 (“The push for data localization requirements . . . reflects an 
inaccurate understanding of the Internet.”). 
 48 Hill, supra note 22, at 24–25. 
 49 Id. at 26. 
 50 See Daskal, supra note 8, at 498 n.79 (“[T]he NSA is likely to have much more 
information at its disposal on any given target than most foreign law enforcement.”). 
 51 Hill, supra note 22, at 25. 
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including those with little domestic oversight, or scant respect for civil rights, 
would be given access to much more potentially sensitive information than ever 
before.52 Newer and smaller Internet providers would be left to determine 
whether and how to comply with law enforcement requests for data.53 They 
would also be significantly less capable of fending off cyber intrusions from 
known cyber actors like Russia and China54 Therefore, the arguments for data 
localization that hinge on the security benefits ignore the fact that data stored 
in-jurisdiction may actually be less secure and more accessible to privacy 
violations from intelligence agencies foreign and domestic. 
III. BILATERAL DATA SHARING AGREEMENTS 
There are arguments that the best way to fix the MLAT process is to amend 
the Privacy Act in ways that would allow ISPs more flexibility to comply with 
law enforcement requests from foreign governments.55 If ISPs were able to 
share more information with foreign governments, then the DOJ would receive 
fewer MLA requests, which would lead to greater efficiency.56 Amending the 
Privacy Act’s blocking provision in strategic ways could ostensibly increase the 
quantity and quality of data flow across borders, without compromising 
international human rights.57 There are also related arguments in favor of 
separate bilateral treaties between relatively like-minded countries to allow a 
freer flow of data.58 Such bilateral agreements might be more realistic because 
they require buy-in from fewer stakeholders, stakeholders that the United States 
can be confident are committed to the rule of law and privacy protections.59 
                                                                                                                     
 52 See supra notes 42–43. 
 53 Hill, supra note 22, at 26. 
 54 See id. at 26 n.105. 
 55 See generally Andrew Keane Woods, The Simplest Cross-Border Fix: Removing 
ECPA’s Blocking Features, LAWFARE (June 15, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/simplest-
cross-border-fix-removing-ecpas-blocking-features [https://perma.cc/QB8U-HZBX]. 
 56 Andrew Keane Woods, Procedural Options for Improving Cross-Border Requests 
for Data, LAWFARE (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/procedural-options-
improving-cross-border-requests-data [https://perma.cc/2UR6-3WRF] (“The pressure on the 
MLAT system—thousands of MLA requests being routed through the DOJ—is the direct 
result of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). If ECPA did not require 
foreign law enforcement officers to get a US warrant in order to compel data, those officers 
would never need to request mutual legal assistance in the first place. The best way to resolve 
the MLA problem, then, is not to speed up the handling of MLA requests, but to end ECPA’s 
requirement that all requests got [sic] through the MLA process.”). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital 
Era: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 4 (2017) (statement of 
Andrew Keane Woods, Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law). 
 59 See Woods, supra note 56 (“Anyone with even passing familiarity with [I]nternet 
governance debates knows that the topic is highly politicized and achieving agreement 
between the major powers is extremely difficult. Even the relatively benign cybercrime 
treaty found non-universal adherence among like-minded western countries and no 
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Bilateral agreements would also require Congress to amend the Privacy Act, 
albeit in a more limited or targeted way. In fact, the DOJ has recently proposed 
legislation that would authorize such an agreement between the United States 
and the United Kingdom (U.S.–U.K. Agreement).60 The proposed Agreement 
would be the first of its kind and an important introductory step to reforming the 
Privacy Act and, therefore, the MLAT process.61  
As it stands now, major American Internet providers interpret the Privacy 
Act’s blocking provision in one of two ways. Google and Facebook interpret it 
as prohibiting them from turning over any content data to any foreign 
government, regardless of the location of the data.62 Microsoft, on the other 
hand, interprets the blocking provision as hinging on the location of the data.63 
Under this interpretation, Microsoft will disclose data if it is located in a country 
with jurisdiction to make the request.64 Importantly, the Privacy Act does not 
prohibit ISPs from sharing non-content data, which is often referred to as 
“metadata,” with foreign governments—even as U.S. law enforcement agencies 
remain required to seek court approval under the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause standard.65 
A. U.S.–U.K. Agreement 
The United Kingdom is an ideal partner for the first data-sharing agreement 
for a number of reasons, including its commitment to democracy and rule of 
law.66 Edward Snowden’s disclosures about Project TEMPORA, which was a 
collaboration between the NSA and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), the British signals intelligence agency, revealed that the 
United Kingdom has been a close intelligence partner with the United States 
                                                                                                                     
accessions by major non-western countries. Add to this the questions of sovereignty, due 
process, and privacy rights and you have a recipe for deep divisions between many of the 
most important countries. For example, it is simply unlikely that the US and China will agree 
to the same set of due process provisions regarding cross-border law enforcement access to 
cloud data. Forging an international agreement that satisfies India, China, Brazil, Russia, and 
the US will likely be so watered down, it would have little utility; in fact, there is a serious 
risk that the resulting agreement would lead to an erosion of privacy rights, not an 
enhancement.”). 
 60 See Scarlet Kim & Greg Nojeim, U.S. DOJ Cross-Border Legislation: Meeting 
Human Rights Requirements from Both Sides of the Pond, LAWFARE (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-doj-cross-border-legislation-meeting-human-rights-requirements 
-both-sides-pond [https://perma.cc/9VNC-RVYA]. 
 61 See Jennifer Daskal & Andrew K. Woods, A New US-UK Data Sharing Treaty?, 
JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24145/u-s-u-k-data-sharing-
treaty/ [https://perma.cc/6M5P-5KS9]. 
 62 Daskal, supra note 8, at 491. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.  
 65 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2012).  
 66 See Woods, supra note 56. 
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since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.67 United States officials have 
also concluded that the United Kingdom has “strong substantive and procedural 
protections for privacy,” and that their legal standards have therefore not been 
at issue in discussions surrounding the proposed agreement.68  
Any bilateral agreement would require that Congress amend provisions of 
the Privacy Act which otherwise block ISPs from sharing data with the U.K. In 
a letter to then-Senate President Joe Biden, then-Assistant Attorney General 
Peter Kadzik broadly outlined DOJ’s legislative proposal for such an 
amendment.69 Kadzik argues that “[r]eforming the MLAT process must remain 
a priority,” but that agreements like the U.S.–U.K. Agreement would serve to 
streamline information sharing while alleviating some of the MLAT backlog, 
which he calls “unsustainable.”70 The letter also openly acknowledges that the 
proposed agreement would establish a framework that can be used in the future 
to enter into similar agreements with other countries, although there has been 
nothing to indicate that additional countries are being considered as potential 
partners at this point.71 
The proposed legislation would amend sections of the Privacy Act, 
including the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communication Act (SCA), and the 
Pen/Trap Statute to allow ISPs to share both content data and non-content data 
(metadata) with foreign governments that have been “certified” by the U.S. 
Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.72 In order to 
gain certifications, foreign governments must meet a long list of specific 
conditions, including (1) guaranteed baseline protections of privacy and civil 
liberties, (2) minimization of data collection of U.S. persons or domiciliaries, 
and (3) a laundry list of technical security controls and procedures.73 
                                                                                                                     
 67 See Hill, supra note 22, at 5; see also Nick Hopkins, From Turing to Snowden: How 
US-UK Pact Forged Modern Surveillance, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardia 
n.com/world/2013/dec/02/turing-snowden-transatlantic-pact-modern-surveillance [https://perma.cc 
/R29K-YX7K] (discussing the relationship between the GCHQ and NSA, along with the 
beginning of intelligence programs after September 11, 2001). 
 68 Nakashima & Peterson, supra note 20. 
 69 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph 
R. Biden, President, U.S. Senate 1–3 (July 15, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from Peter J. 
Kadzik], http://www.netcaucus.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-7-15-US-UK-Legislative-Proposal-
to-Hill.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ARN-V9UP]. 
 70 Id. at 2. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Section-by-Section Analysis of Legislation To Permit the Secure and Privacy-
Protective Exchange of Electronic Data for the Purposes of Combating Serious Crime 
Including Terrorism, in Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, supra note 69, at 1 [hereinafter Analysis 
of DOJ Proposal]. 
 73 Id. at 2–3. 
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1. Privacy Protections 
In order to qualify for access to American-held data, the U.S. Attorney 
General must certify that the foreign government’s (here, the United 
Kingdom’s) domestic law “affords robust substantive and procedural 
protections for privacy and civil liberties.”74 The proposed legislation specifies 
the minimum baseline protections that must be in place, including domestic 
protections that are consistent with Chapters 1 and 2 of the international 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, as well as a “demonstrate[d] respect for 
the rule of law,” “principles of non-discrimination,” “international universal 
human rights,” and the continued “global free flow of information.”75 
2. Data Minimization 
DOJ’s proposed legislation would also require that the U.S. Attorney 
General and Secretary of State certify that any foreign government has adopted 
“appropriate procedures” to ensure that information concerning U.S. persons is 
only acquired, retained, or disseminated in the most minimal way possible.76 
The foreign government may not target U.S. persons, nor may the foreign 
government target a non-U.S. person for purposes of obtaining information 
concerning a U.S. person.77 Also, the foreign government may not request 
information in order to share it with third-party countries or even with the United 
States.78 
3. Controls and Procedures 
The proposed legislation elaborates on the requirements that countries must 
comply with in order to receive certification by providing sixteen specific 
provisions regarding the procedures with which data is to be collected, retained, 
and transferred.79 These provisions include, in part, the following requirements: 
 Requests must be related to “serious crime[s]” like terrorism; 
 The request must pertain to a target (whether it be a specific person, a 
bank account, or an electronic device) that is specific and identifiable 
rather than engage in bulk-collection; 
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 The request must be grounded on a “reasonable justification based on 
articulable and credible-facts”; 
 The request must be subject to independent review; 
 The request “must be for a fixed and limited duration” that is “no longer 
than reasonably necessary to accomplish its approved purpose”; 
 The requests “may not be used to infringe freedom of speech”; 
 The foreign government must delete information that is “relevant to the 
prevention…or prosecution of serious crime[s]” or to protect against 
serious harm; 
 “[T]he foreign government may not disseminate the content of a 
communication” of a person to United States authorities unless it 
“relates to significant harm” to the United States; 
 The foreign government must reciprocate data access to the United 
States.80 
The proposed legislation is still under consideration. There is no guarantee 
that the text as originally proposed would ultimately become the relevant law. 
That said, apart from a few specific areas of ambiguity, the legislation is 
commendable in its straightforward and thorough articulation of the 
requirements that the U.S. Attorney General must find to be satisfied before 
certifying a foreign government as a data-sharing partner.  
a. Pros of the Proposed Legislation 
Any analysis of the proposed legislation must first acknowledge that the text 
of the actual agreement (as opposed to the text of the DOJ’s legislative proposal) 
between the United States and United Kingdom has not been made public,81 and 
that unless and until it is, all analyses regarding its merit cannot be 
comprehensive. Still, this proposed legislation gets many things right as far as 
reforms. First, requiring that the foreign government has acceded to the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, or passed similar laws that put that 
government in accordance with the Convention,82 ensures the potential data-
sharing partner is like-minded in its commitment to a fair process of data 
collection and dissemination. The Budapest Convention, which has been 
accepted by over fifty countries including the United States, attempts to 
harmonize substantive laws internationally as they relate to cybercrime 
offenses, and provide standards for criminal procedural law that comport with 
international human rights and liberties.83 
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Next, the legislation’s requirement that a request from a foreign government 
be subject to review or oversight by “a court, judge, magistrate, or other 
independent authority” is crucial to ensure that data requests comport with 
relevant privacy and national security laws in the requesting country.84 Various 
European legal decisions have recently highlighted the necessity for 
independent review.85 The proposed legislation’s inclusion of an independent 
review requirement is therefore consistent with American laws and recent trends 
in European law.86 Requiring independent review also serves to ensure that 
other requirements from the proposed legislation are met, including that requests 
be “based on articulable and credible facts,” as well as that the request be of a 
limited and reasonable duration.87  
Finally, the proposed legislation is right to forbid foreign governments from 
requesting information pertaining to U.S. persons or domiciliaries. Instead, 
foreign data-sharing partners would continue to rely on the MLAT process, and 
all of the bureaucratic checks and balances attendant with it, in order to access 
information on Americans. The legislation even contemplates that incidental 
collection of data from U.S. persons will almost certainly take place, but 
accounts for that collection by requiring that the foreign country minimize such 
data to the extent practicable and that they not share that data with either the 
United States or any other third-party country.88  
b. Cons of the Proposed Legislation 
There are ambiguities and omissions within the text of the proposed 
legislation that have given privacy advocates cause for concern. For instance, 
although the proposed legislation requires that requests be subject to review or 
oversight by an “independent authority,” it does not require that the request be 
issued by a court.89 Currently the “Judicial Commissioners” in the United 
Kingdom, who review the U.K. Secretary of State’s authorization for 
surveillance, approve warrants and requests so long as they find that it is 
“necessary” for national security and “proportionate” to the intrusion.90 The 
United Kingdom’s Judicial Commissioners are appointed to three-year terms by 
the prime minister, which raises questions about their independence.91 Privacy 
skeptics point to the fact that the  
U.S. Department of Justice has consistently taken the position that government 
surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is subject 
to “oversight” from FISA Courts, even though those courts merely approve 
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guidelines which govern some aspects of government surveillance,92 as 
evidence that ostensible oversight mandated by the proposed legislation might 
not be all that strong, or all that independent. The proposed legislation’s 
insistence that any requests be based on a “reasonable justification” has also 
been met with some skepticism.93 Unless the Agreement is released to the public 
prior to the legislation’s consideration, skeptics will probably not be satisfied. 
Additionally, the proposed legislation is notable for its omission of any 
requirement that targets of surveillance be notified of that surveillance after the 
fact. U.S. law requires after-the-fact notice of any real-time surveillance, 
however U.K. law does not.94 Still, recent decisions by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice have spotlighted and 
underscored the necessity of notice as a means for people to seek a legal remedy 
if their rights or liberties have been infringed.95 These decisions track with 
current U.S. law by requiring notification once it can be provided without 
jeopardizing the purpose of the surveillance or investigation.96  
Lastly, the proposed legislation grants a significant amount of authority to 
the U.S. Attorney General, and thus the executive branch, without any clearly 
designated role for oversight from other branches of government.97 Indeed, the 
legislation stipulates that any certifications made by the U.S. Attorney General 
“shall not be subject to judicial or administrative review.”98 Instead, the 
legislation requires only that the U.S. Attorney General give sixty days’ notice 
to the House and Senate judiciary and foreign affairs committees prior to 
making a determination regarding certification.99 By excluding the Agreement 
from judicial and administrative review, and failing to provide a mechanism for 
meaningful congressional oversight, the Agreement vests significant and novel 
authority in unelected officials of the executive branch. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
The current information-sharing regime is unsustainable. Modest 
improvements to the process and administration of MLATs are a necessary first 
step for supporting foreign law enforcement agencies and discouraging 
problematic behaviors like data localization. Simultaneously, however, there 
needs to be a more comprehensive long-term reform of the current MLAT 
framework. There are several viable options for potential reforms, each 
providing unique benefits and posing different challenges. While any of these 
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options would be preferable to maintaining the status quo, this Essay advocates 
a more cautious and narrow set of changes to the framework in order to test them 
before instituting policies and procedures that dramatically transform the way 
that data is shared internationally.  
A. Three Possible Short-Term MLAT Improvements 
There is a set of problems in the MLAT process that exacerbate the already 
difficult data-sharing process, such as a lack of a standardized online process, a 
lack of guidance to requesting countries, and a lack of adequate staffing and 
funding at the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs 
(OIA).100 These problems have relatively straightforward solutions, which were 
outlined in part by a 2013 President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies but have not yet been implemented.101 The 
improvements fall into the following three categories: (1) streamlining the 
application process; (2) raising awareness domestically and abroad; and (3) 
devoting more money and manpower to OIA. 
1. Streamlining 
First, there are simple, practical, and straightforward ways to streamline the 
MLAT application process. Incredibly, MLA requests are still submitted in 
hardcopy form, and there is no standard template provided in order to 
demonstrate what an adequate request looks like, nor anything in the way of 
guidance or instructions on the OIA website.102 This is far from ideal, as there 
is no reason to expect foreign law enforcement stakeholders, like a local police 
department in Ireland, to be familiar with the MLAT process, or to be well-
versed enough in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to provide details 
adequate to show probable cause. Indeed, the OIA often has to send back MLA 
requests to foreign governments because of the requests’ inability, without 
more, to satisfy a magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause.103 
Providing instructions and a template for data requests would be a simple way 
to ensure the quality and consistency of requests and alleviate a major source of 
inefficiency in the MLAT process. 
Another way to streamline the MLAT process would be to take measures to 
designate specific attorneys at USAO, and/or specific district courts to handle 
MLAT requests.104 Peter Swire and Justin Hemmings report that interviews 
with officials involved in the process blame lengthy request response times on 
the fact that requests are regularly assigned to Assistant U.S. Attorneys that lack 
familiarity with MLA requests and are typically also handling a full docket of 
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other, more local, assignments.105 Federal magistrate judges appear similarly 
ignorant.106 Part of the reason for this problem is that the current process refers 
requests to the federal district where the data is actually being held,107 even 
though a 2009 amendment to the Privacy Act allows any federal court to issue 
a warrant, anywhere in the nation.108 The current system of farming out MLA 
requests to attorneys who are unfamiliar with the process, in any number of 
federal districts that have no particular reason to be aware of MLATs at all, is a 
paragon of inefficiency. 
2. Raising Awareness 
Raising awareness about the MLAT process would not only improve the 
quality and consistency of requests, but also increase the speed with which those 
requests are processed.109 It would also promote transparency at home and 
abroad; assuage lingering frustrations in the international law enforcement 
community; and perhaps disincentivize problematic unilateral action, like data 
localization policies, on the part of foreign governments.110 Any efforts to raise 
awareness must include providing resources such as templates, guidance, and 
training about how to make, track, and execute data requests. 
3. Increasing OIA Funding 
Finally, and perhaps most straightforwardly, the OIA needs increased 
funding and staff. DOJ itself has publicized that while MLA requests for 
assistance have increased dramatically, government resources “have not kept 
pace.”111 The 2013 Presidential Review Group report recommended providing 
OIA more resources, and proposed budgets for 2015,112 2016,113 and 2017114 
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have all recommended increases in the number of attorneys and the amount of 
money that OIA should receive, though those numbers have varied 
considerably.115 While the Fiscal Year 2019 proposed budget may be the most 
modest request to date, OIA still requested adding seventy-two staff members 
and a funding increase of over $10 million.116 Previous requests have failed to 
receive congressional approval generally, though smaller, more specific parts of 
requests have been approved.117 Without increased resources, OIA will continue 
to flounder under its heavy backlog and constant influx of foreign MLA 
requests.118 With OIA’s heavy backlog, the international law enforcement 
community will continue to seek alternative and potentially deleterious data-
collection policies.119 
B. Four Possible Long-Term MLAT Reforms 
As noted above, short-term reforms to the MLAT process should be coupled 
with more dynamic reform in the ways that ISPs can comply with the growing 
international demand for information. There are at least four promising avenues 
for reform which all require a similar set of actions from Congress. While this 
Essay briefly elaborates on all four potential reform mechanisms, it asserts that 
it is in the best long-term interest of the United States, global Internet users, and 
Internet Service Providers that any significant reforms be done in a 
conscientious and intentional way. Accordingly, this paper ultimately 
recommends a slow start to reform, one that focuses explicitly and exclusively 
on sharing data with the United Kingdom as a pilot program before enacting 
sweeping reforms. By allowing data sharing with only the United Kingdom, and 
not opening the door to any other foreign partnerships, the United States can test 
the policy outcomes of the new reforms without completely abandoning the 
status quo or fundamentally altering the current international Internet privacy 
regime before we know where that will lead.  
1. Amend the Privacy Act Broadly 
The most dramatic way to reform the MLAT process would be to rewrite 
the Privacy Act without provisions that block ISPs from sharing data with 
                                                                                                                     
 115 For example, the Office of International Affairs formally requested, for Fiscal Year 
2016, 141 additional staff members, including seventy-seven attorneys, and over $32 million 
increase in funding. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016, supra note 113. 
 116 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GENERAL LEGAL ACTIVITIES CRIMINAL DIVISION (CRM): FY 
2019 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1033246/ 
download [https://perma.cc/YP6L-LQL8] (“This support is imperative to avoid further 
backlogs in the critical support provided by OIA to protect the United States and support 
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, as well as our state and local law enforcement partners.”). 
 117 Swire & Hemmings, supra note 9, at 717. 
 118 Id. 716. 
 119 Id.  
108 REFORMING THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY [Vol. 79 
foreign governments. Congress could add sections to the Wiretap Act, the 
Stored Communications Act, and the Pen/Trap Statute that detail when and 
under what circumstances providers may comply with foreign requests for 
assistance. There are myriad ways to write such amendments, and many ways 
that they could safeguard the privacy of American citizens. For instance, 
Congress could amend sections of the statute to only allow for the exchange of 
information regarding users who are citizens of the requesting country, and only 
insofar as that information pertains to crimes committed within the country.120  
However, such blanket amendments are ill-advised because of 
complications that will inevitably arise due to the conflicting criminal 
procedures in different countries, the growing globalization of crime, and the 
increased interconnectivity of Internet users.121 What should be done, for 
example, when American citizens are implicated or incidentally monitored 
during the normal course of an investigation but after data has already been 
shared? What is to be done when requests for assistance involve citizens of 
multiple different, perhaps adversarial, jurisdictions? These examples should 
underscore the innumerable ways that developing trends in technology and the 
Internet are unpredictable and complex, which necessitates careful and narrow 
reforms to existing laws and policies.  
2. Bilateral Treaties and U.S.–U.K. Agreement Framework 
Bilateral treaties like the proposed U.S.–U.K. Agreement are more 
promising and less problematic than broad reforms to the Privacy Act because 
they are more specific. By articulating particular foreign countries that are 
suitable for data sharing outside of the MLAT framework, Congress could 
ensure that ISPs are only able to share data with trusted partners who have a 
demonstrated track record of sound criminal procedures and privacy laws. This 
more limited reform has the benefit of alleviating some of the pressures on the 
OIA and ISPs while maintaining the more managed MLAT process for other 
countries that make requests that implicate American citizens and domiciliaries. 
While the U.S.–U.K. Agreement is a good attempt to set baseline standards for 
future bilateral agreements, it must be improved in several important ways. 
First, although the Agreement does necessitate that requests be reviewed for 
approval by an independent body, there must be a more specific definition of 
what the term “independent” requires.122 In the United Kingdom, requests for 
surveillance are approved by Judicial Commissioners, who are appointed to 
their positions in three-year terms, making them less isolated from outside 
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pressures than would be preferred.123 Data requests from law enforcement 
agencies are an infiltration into the private lives of Internet users and must only 
be made when necessary for valid law enforcement purposes. The costs inherent 
with potential privacy violations are too great to be entrusted to anyone who is 
not completely independent from public and political pressures. The U.S.–U.K. 
Agreement should acknowledge that cost by stipulating that MLA requests be 
reviewed by a member of the judicial branch. 
Second, the Agreement must specify in greater detail what constitutes a 
“reasonable justification”124 for data requests. Although the Agreement insists 
that such a justification be based on “credible facts, particularity, legality and 
severity,”125 privacy proponents are right to criticize such requirements as too 
vague. In order to authorize surveillance or data collection from American 
companies, foreign governments must be held to a higher standard in justifying 
the necessity of their requests. This is not to say that other governments should 
be held to the unique American probable cause standard, only that more than a 
reasonableness test should be required.126 Doing so would ensure that the 
privacy of global Internet users is only infringed when absolutely necessary. 
Finally, the Agreement should require that targets be notified after the fact 
of their surveillance or data collection. It is irrelevant that U.K. law does not 
require notification, because it is America’s prerogative to place reasonable 
regulations on the use of American-held data.127 Requiring that targets be 
notified increases transparency, promotes accountability, provides for legal 
redress in the case of abuses, and, most importantly, comports with growing 
trends in European legal decisions that promote notification as a best practice.128  
3. Mutual Legal Assistance Statute 
An interesting alternative to bilateral treaties is the enactment of specific 
statutes which would govern legal assistance to foreign countries, rather than 
the existing regime of treaties. A Mutual Legal Assistance Statute (MLAS) is 
ostensibly preferable to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) because it 
is more flexible and more easily changed to account for the exigencies of the 
contemporary geopolitical situation.129 Treaties are difficult to change, and 
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mustering the political will to make such changes is rare.130 Instead, MLAS 
would be relatively easy for the U.S. Congress to amend as it sees fit. Proponents 
of the MLAS approach point to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) as an 
example.131 The VWP was developed to address the ever-growing numbers of 
visa applicants to the United States and the difficulty with which U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection had with dealing with so many requests.132 The VWP 
started slow, with only the countries most motivated to ease travel into the 
United States going to the trouble of complying with the requirements for the 
program, but has grown to accept numerous countries, though only those with 
the highest quality visa applications.133 When the San Bernardino shooting 
demonstrated shortcomings in the VWP process, Congress amended the 
governing statute within days to add new requirements and controls.134 MLAS 
proponents point to the speed and ease of substantively amending any potential 
MLAS as evidence of the virtue of such a plan.135 An MLAS regime would be 
useful in many ways, but continues to pose sticky questions regarding when a 
country ought to be deemed adequate for inclusion to the program and when 
requests ought to be deemed adequate for bypassing the existing MLAT process. 
As mentioned above, more data is required before these questions can be 
answered in a satisfactory way. Instead, before dramatic changes to the existing 
data-sharing regime are made, the United States should enact less ambitious and 
more targeted reforms. 
4. Hybrid Bilateral Agreement/MLAS Approach 
Analysis of any of the potential reforms reveals that there are benefits to 
each, but also that beginning dramatic reforms prematurely could cause 
problems that render them counterproductive. Instead, the United States should 
proceed cautiously, with smaller scale reforms that measure outcomes before 
significant changes to the existing privacy regime take place. This Essay 
advocates for a hybrid bilateral agreement/MLAS approach, whereby the United 
States proceeds with the U.S–U.K. Agreement, but with an important corollary: 
explicitly limit the agreement to the United Kingdom, without providing any 
mechanism for further agreements for the time being. An exclusive agreement 
provides all of the efficiency benefits of other proposed reforms without any of 
the drawbacks. The OIA will see a significant reduction of the over 20,000 
yearly requests for assistance from the United Kingdom,136 and the global 
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privacy community can monitor the resulting outcomes before committing itself 
to more dramatic changes.  
Rather than authorize the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State to 
certify countries as data-sharing partners, the authorizing legislation for the 
U.S.–U.K. Agreement should make narrow allowances for ISPs to comply with 
direct requests exclusively from the United Kingdom. Such legislation avoids 
vesting so much authority in the executive branch without mechanisms for 
oversight or review, as the current proposal would do. Such a legislative scheme 
would therefore achieve the flexibility that a MLAS would provide, while 
avoiding the sticky questions that an MLAS regime currently presents. Like the 
Visa Waiver Program, such an exclusive U.S.–U.K. Agreement could be easily 
expanded to include other countries, but only those countries who are most 
motivated to enact policies and procedures that make them ideal candidates for 
data-sharing. The United States is in a position of relative bargaining power 
currently as a result of the dominance of American ISPs and the proliferation of 
data held in American jurisdictions. Other countries will meet America halfway 
by making changes to their privacy policies that make them more attractive data-
sharing partners, which will help ease the difficulty currently posed by 
evaluating the often varied and divergent privacy laws and criminal procedures 
of foreign governments.  
Finally, such an exclusive agreement would provide the United States with 
more leverage to improve privacy policies regarding the collection of metadata. 
As mentioned previously, the current Privacy Act regime allows foreign 
governments to collect metadata directly from ISPs without limitation, even as 
American law enforcement is prevented from such access. As data collection 
and communication technologies evolve, rules that differentiate between 
content data and metadata are increasingly distinguishing between data types 
that do not have any differences.137 Metadata can often be more personal and 
useful than content data,138 and should be regulated accordingly. Countries like 
the United Kingdom seeking special access to American-held data should be 
required to accede to stricter metadata collection policies, and stipulating as 
such within new exclusive agreements could be an equitable compromise.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The existing MLAT process needs reform. Until meaningful changes are 
made, the international community will continue to witness problematic 
behaviors on the part of governments and law enforcement agencies dissatisfied 
with the status quo. As has been shown, multiple avenues for change exist, 
though each poses its own benefits and drawbacks. The best way forward for 
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the United States, however, is to proceed with modest reform by entering into 
an exclusive agreement with the United Kingdom with highly specific standards 
and requirements for the protection of human rights.  
Entering into an agreement with the United Kingdom provides the United 
States with an opportunity to experiment with MLAT reform, without 
fundamentally altering the data-sharing status quo. By starting slow, the United 
States and the United Kingdom can identify potential problems and difficulties 
that may arise as both nations embark on a new and unpredictable privacy 
regime. This limited agreement would require compromises regarding criminal 
procedure, independent review of data-sharing requests, notification to targets 
of surveillance, and the use of metadata. All of these changes serve to strengthen 
privacy protections for Internet users worldwide, while promoting international 
law enforcement and alleviating some of the existing burden on the U.S. 
Department of Justice posed by the MLAT process. 
